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INTRODUCTION
In the early 1960s, Barry Mann, Cynthia Weil, and Phil Spector
composed the lyrics and music for the song You've Lost That Lovin'
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School 2006; B.B.A., Marketing
and Finance, University of Michigan, 2003. Thank you Mom and Dad for your
unconditional love, endless support, and timely tuition payments.
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Feelin', which the Righteous Brothers originally recorded in 1964.1
Forty years and over eight million public performances 2 of the sound
recording later, You've Lost That Lovin'Feelin'became the most played
song of all time on American radio and television. 3 Despite the Right-
eous Brothers' signature sound largely driving the long-term popular-
ity of Lovin' Feelin', the duo has never received a single royalty check
for any of the eight million nondigital4 transmissions.5 Mann, Weil,
and Spector, however, have earned royalties for each of the eight mil-
lion radio, television, and motion picture public performances. 6
In a variation of the Righteous Brothers' situation, members of
the same musical group may also earn different royalties from public
performances of sound recordings. Paul Simon and Art Garfunkel
comprised one of the 1960s' most popular folk-rock duos, culminat-
ing in their ten-week chart-topping album Bridge over Troubled Water.7
While Simon solely wrote the vast majority of the duo's material," un-
doubtedly each member's distinctive voice and personality also con-
1 Dan Daley, The Righteous Brothers' You've Lost That Lovin' Feelin' (Mar. 1,
2002), http://mixonline.com/recording/interviews/audio-righteous_brothers_
youve/index.html.
2 The Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act) defines "perform" to include play-
ing the work. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Also, the Act defines performing a work pub-
licly as performing the work at a place open to the public or by transmitting or
otherwise communicating the work to the public. Id.
3 Broadcast Music Inc., BMI Announces Top 100 Songs of the Century (Dec. 14,
1999), http://www.bmi.coM/news/199912/1999121488.asp ("The 8 million perform-
ances of 'You've Lost that Lovin' Feeling' [sic] equals more than 45 years of back-to-
back play.").
4 As will be discussed in greater detail in Part II.A.3, Congress has recently
granted a public performance right for sound recordings that are transmitted digitally
(e.g., satellite radio). Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-39, sec. 2, § 106(6), 109 Stat. 336, 336 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(6)).
5 While You've Lost That Lovin'Feelin'was copyrighted prior to 1978 and is gov-
erned by the Copyright Act of 1909, the 1909 Act does not recognize public perform-
ance rights in sound recordings. See Michael B. Landau, "Publication," Musical
Compositions, and the Copyright Act of 1909: Still Crazy After All These Years, 2 VAND. J. ENr.
L. & PRAc. 29, 36-37 (2000). Likewise, § 114(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 also
does not recognize public performance rights in sound recordings, stating that per-
formers' rights "do not include any right of performance under section 106(4)." 17
U.S.C. § 114(a).
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (stating that musical works are protected if performed
publicly).
7 Richie Unterberger, Simon and Garfunkel Biography, http://
launch.yahoo.com/ar-263991-bio-Simon-Garfunkel (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
8 Id.; Greg Nesteroff et al., The Paul Simon & Art Garfunkel FAQ § 4.1, http://
www.ckk.chalmers.se/guitar/sg-faq/4.html#1 (last modified Sept. 1, 1997).
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tributed to Simon and Garfunkel's success, with most in the music
industry agreeing that Garfunkel's high tenor was integral for record-
ing their most popular songs. 9 Despite Garfunkel's significant contri-
bution to 'the duo's long-term success, he has no copyright protection
(thus no right to demand royalties) in the public performances of Si-
mon and Garfunkel sound recordings.10 Simon, on the other hand,
composed most of the duo's songs,"l entitling him to copyright pro-
tection (thus possibly receiving royalties) for all public performances
of those musical works. 12
Why do Mann, Weil, Spector, and Simon have the right to receive
royalties for the public performances of their musical compositions
while the Righteous Brothers and Garfunkel, despite their undeniable
contributions to the success of the sound recordings, largely earn
nothing for their performance of the sound recording? The U.S. cop-
yright regime holds the answer.
Sound recordings are comprised of two distinct copyrightable
works: the musical composition (i.e., the notes and lyrics written by
Simon), and the sound recording (i.e., the recorded performance of
the song by Simon and Garfunkel). 13 While Congress has chosen to
protect public performances of the underlying written music, 14 it has
consistently refused to extend comprehensive protection to public
performances of sound recordings.1 5
Accordingly, Mann, Weil, Spector, and Simon, as composers of
the underlying music and lyrics, have the right to earn royalties for
public performances of the musical compositions. The performers
(the Righteous Brothers and Garfunkel), on the other hand, receive
no general protection for their work in creating the sound recording.
However, this Note argues that, in light of the policies supporting the
United States copyright regime and other equitable and practical con-
9 Unterberger, supra note 7.
10 See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (stating that owners of sound recording copyrights have no
rights of public performance protection).
11 Unterberger, supra note 7.
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); id. § 106(4).
13 Jonathan Franklin, Pay To Play: Enacting a Performance Right in Sound Recordings
in the Age of Digital Audio Broadcasting, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83, 83-84
(1993); Ronald Mark Wells, Comment, You Can't Always Get What You Want but Digital
Sampling Can Get What You Need!, 22 AKRON L. Rxv. 691, 696-97 (1989).
14 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
15 Id. § 114 (stating that the exclusive fights of copyright owners in sound record-
ings "do not include any right of performance under section 106(4)"); see also id.
§ 106(6) (granting protection only for public performances of sound recordings that
are digitally transmitted).
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cerns, Congress should amend the Copyright Act of 1976, extending
protection to sound recording public performances.
In Part I, this Note analyzes the historical underpinnings and
availability of protection for sound recordings. In Part II, this Note
focuses on policy arguments for, and against, a congressional amend-
ment protecting a public performance right in sound recordings. Ul-
timately, this Note concludes that because the policies in favor of
adopting an amendment outweigh the policies against, Congress
should amend the Copyright Act to extend public performance pro-
tection to sound recordings. First, however, this Note turns to the
scope of congressional power to protect sound recordings.
I. HiSTORICAL AND CURRENT "PROTECTION" OF A SOUND RECORDING
PERFORMANCE RIGHT
A. May vs. Should-Congress's Ability To Protect
Before this Note sketches a brief history outlining the past and
present extent of sound recording protection (if any), this Note will
first address the scope of Congress's ability to protect sound record-
ings. As this Part will conclude, the question this Note must address is
not whether Congress may protect public performance rights in sound
recordings, but rather should Congress protect public performances of
sound recordings.
Congress has long had the ability to protect sound recordings.
This ability flows directly from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,
which states that Congress has the general power to grant "Authors"
for a limited time the "exclusive Right to their respective writings" in
order "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 16
Courts have historically interpreted Congress's Section 8 power
broadly, concluding that Congress may extend protection to sound
recordings. 17 In Goldstein v. California, the Supreme Court found that,
though the Federal Copyright Act of 1909 did not preempt state laws
outlawing music piracy, Congress could "[a] t any time ... determine
that a particular [type of work] is worthy of national protection
and ... federal copyright protection may be authorized."18
In addition to Congress having the general power to protect
sound recordings as a type of work, Congress has historically also had
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973).
18 Id.; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Congress's Power To Promote the Progress of Science:
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (2002) (discussing Congress's power
to enact overinclusive copyright protections).
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the ability to protect authors' rights to perform works. While this Note
will address the Copyright Act of 1976 in more detail in Part I.C, § 106
of the Act outlines the general rights of copyright holders.19 In
§ 106(4), Congress protects authors' rights to publicly perform certain
types of works.20 However, Congress did not include sound record-
ings as a type of work that enjoys a § 106(4) right to perform. 21
Section 106(4), though, is not the only section protecting public
performances; Congress recently adopted § 106(6), which protects
certain sound recording performances based on their type of trans-
mission. 22 In adding § 106(6), Congress extended copyright protec-
tion to sound recording performances involving digital
transmissions. 23 Therefore, because Congress has the ability to pro-
tect sound recordings as a type of work and public performances as a
type of right, it is not a question of whether Congress may protect
public performances of sound recordings; Congress has the authority
to do so. Rather, the issue this Note must address is whether Congress
should protect sound recording public performances.
This Note will next outline how Congress, despite having the abil-
ity to protect sound recording public performances, has never pro-
tected such rights.
B. Pre-1976 Sound Recording Protection
In granting composers of the music and lyrics (but not those re-
sponsible for the sound recording) protection, Congress and the
courts have drawn a distinction between the musical composition and
the sound recording. 24 The origin of this distinction can be traced to
the 1908 Supreme Court case of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co.25 In White-Smith, the defendant sold player pianos and per-
forated rolls of music that the pianos "read," and the plaintiff was a
music composer who owned copyrights in certain musical composi-
tions. The plaintiff brought an action claiming the defendant's manu-
facturing of perforated rolls for its player piano that allowed the piano
19 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (outlining the authors' "[e]xclusive rights in [their] copy-
righted works").
20 Id. § 106(4).
21 Id. (enumerating only "literary, musical [i.e., the written musical composition],
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other au-
diovisual works" for public performance protection).
22 Id. § 106(6).
23 The 1976 Act, as amended, defines a digital transmission as "a transmission in
whole or in part in a digital or other non-analog format." Id.
24 Franklin, supra note 13, at 88.
25 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
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to perform the plaintiffs copyrighted songs infringed the plaintiffs
copyright in the musical compositions. 26 The defendant won at trial,
and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the perforated rolls
were not copies of the musical compositions because it was the sheet
music that was protected from copying in a like form, not the underly-
ing song in general. 27 Unlike sheet music, the Court found that be-
cause player piano rolls could not be read by the naked eye, the
defendant did not infringe upon the plaintiffs copyrights in the un-
derlying musical compositions. 28
In formulating this holding, the White-Smith Court developed a
"direct perception" test, which drew firm distinctions between copying
the underlying sheet music, on one hand, and sound recordings on
the other. The Court stated that such distinctions were appropriate
because a person could not "read" and reproduce the musical compo-
sition from the phonograph or perforated piano roll, 29 and thus one
could not "'regard the reproduction [of a phonograph] as the copy
or publication"' of the sheet music 30 (later known as the direct per-
ception test31 ). Therefore, by finding that phonorecords (the physi-
cal embodiments of sound recordings, such as compact discs) were
not copies or publications, the Supreme Court in White-Smith pre-
vented subsequent courts from extending copyright protection to du-
plications or public performances of sound recordings. 32
One year later, Congress incorporated similar elements to that of.
White-Smith's direct perception test into the Copyright Act of 1909 33
when Congress required that a musical composition be set in a form
that humans can see and read.34 Ultimately, Congress codified pro-
tection for the musical composition's public performance but not for
the sound recording,3 5 thus "preventing the possibility of finding a
copyright infringement in cases where the sound recording itself was
duplicated or performed publicly."3 6 However, due to the increasing
26 Id. at 8-9.
27 Id. at 17-18.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 17.
30 Id. at 17-18 (quoting Steam v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901)).
31 Franklin, supra note 13, at 88.
32 Id.
33 Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976); see also Franklin, supra note
13, at 88.
34 § 1(e), 35 Stat. at 1075-76.
35 Id. (stating that the copyright holder has the exclusive right to "perform the
copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition" (emphasis added)).
36 Franklin, supra note 13, at 88.
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threat of music piracy, Congress could not withhold sound recording
protection forever.
Congress enacted the Sound Recording Act of 197137 in an at-
tempt to combat the growing threat of record piracy, which became
more economically attractive due to advances in copying technolo-
gies.3 8 Congress drafted the 1971 Act almost exclusively to eliminate
record piracy's economic incentive, but it did not extend the "full
'bundle' of rights" to sound recording copyright holders.39 Specifi-
cally, the 1971 Act protected sound recording creators by prohibiting
exact duplicates of sound recordings but did "not grant[ ] the right of
public performance." 40 However, this was not the final time Congress
considered protecting sound recording performances.
C. The Copyright Act of 1976 and Current "Protection"
Congress again considered adopting a sound recording perform-
ance right when drafting the Copyright Act of 1976 (the current copy-
right regime).41 Before drafting the 1976 Act, Congress heard
extensive testimony from the Register of Copyrights (the Register) in
favor of a performance right, while a collection of broadcasters testi-
fied against expanding protection. 42 While the Senate's version of the
1976 Act flatly denied performance rights in sound recordings, the
House's version, which Congress ultimately enacted through the 1976
Act, withheld judgment on the matter, requesting from the Register's
office an in-depth report detailing the issues surrounding sound re-
cording performance rights. 43
In 1978, the Register submitted its recommendation to Congress
regarding a public performance fight in sound recordings, 44 ardently
supporting such a right.4 5 In support of this position, the Register
relied on economic and public policy arguments, 46 particularly that
37 Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
38 S. REP. No. 104-128, at 10 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 357.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Statement of the Register of Copyrights, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763, 12,764 (Mar. 27,
1978).
45 Id. at 12,765 ("The Fundamental Public Policy Issue: Should performers, or record
producers, or both, enjoy any rights under Federal law with respect to public perform-
ances of sound recordings to which the [sic] have contributed? Conclusion: Yes.").
46 Id. at 12,764-66 (arguing that artists should have a sound recording public
performance right because "sound recordings [are] the 'writings of an author,"' free
airplay of sound recordings does not constitute adequate compensation, imposing
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the 1976 Act preempted state copyright protection, and therefore the
1976 Act became performers' only avenue of protection.47 However,
despite the Register's strong endorsement, Congress has yet to amend
the 1976 Act to include a comprehensive sound recording perform-
ance right.48
An examination of the 1976 Act shows clear congressional intent
to withhold a sound recording performance right. Section 106(4),
which grants certain works a right of public performance, does not
include "sound recordings" as a type of work protected.49 In addition
to omitting sound recordings from § 106(4), Congress expressly en-
acted § 114, which states that "It]he exclusive rights of the owner of
copyright in a sound recording.., do not include any right of perform-
ance."50 Since the codification of the 1976 Act, several Congressional
representatives have attempted, but failed, to amend the 1976 Act to
include such a right.51
Next, this Note turns from analyzing the current state of sound
recording performance protection to arguments for and against con-
gressional adoption of such protection.
I. POLICIES FOR AND AGAINST ADOPTION OF A SOUND RECORDING
PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT
Congress may provide a public performance right in sound re-
cordings52 but has yet to provide such a right.53 When considering
the extension of copyright protection, Congress either implicitly or
explicitly balances policy issues in a classic cost-benefit analysis.54
That is, on one hand, the artists' monopoly from copyright results in
higher-priced copyrighted goods, which is society's "cost" of copyright
protection. On the other hand, this monopoly generally spurs crea-
performance royalties would not curtail certain types of programming, a performance
right would not be an "unwarranted windfall for performers," and preemption of
state law left performers worse off than they were before the 1976 Act-among other
reasons).
47 Id. at 12,765.
48 S. REP. No. 104-128, at 11, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 357-58.
49 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000).
50 Id. § 114(a) (emphasis added).
51 Franklin, supra note 13, at 84 n.10, 92.
52 See supra Part I.A.
53 See supra Part I.C.
54 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(finding that extension of copyright protection to additional works "involves a diffi-
cult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and ex-
ploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing
interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other").
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tion of copyrighted materials, resulting in a wider selection of copy-
righted goods-society's "benefit" from copyright protection.
Next, this Note analyzes the costs and benefits of extending copy-
right protection to sound recording performances, ultimately con-
cluding that the benefits of increased public welfare and the artists'
natural rights to enjoy the fruit of their labors outweigh the costs of
protection. Therefore, Congress should amend the Copyright Act of
1976 to protect sound recording performances.
A. Arguments for Congressional Adoption of a Performance Right
1. Increased Amount of Sound Recordings
Congressional extension of copyright protection to types of works
and rights effectively confers a limited monopoly right upon authors,
which often motivates authors to create more works, thus benefiting
society through diversity of choice. The Founding Fathers envisioned
this benefit to society and granted Congress, through Article I, Sec-
tion 8, the ability to provide an author a temporary monopoly over his
work, which would increase the total number of works and thus pro-
mote the "Progress of Science and useful Arts." 55
The Supreme Court has interpreted two portions of Article I, Sec-
tion 8's intellectual property language in conformity with the notion
that Article I, Section 8 was intended as a means of increasing the
total number of works. First, the Court has interpreted the "[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" language as akin to pro-
moting additional creation of works. In United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc.,56 the Court stated that copyright protection's practical
"reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of
the products of his creative genius, '57 which would ultimately increase
the total amount of works publicly available.
Second, in addition to the Constitution's "promote the progress"
language, the Court has also interpreted Article I, Section 8's grant of
protection for "limited [t]imes" language as further motivation to in-
crease the amount of copyrighted works. In Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.,58 the Court found that
[this] limited grant [was] a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activ-
ity of authors ... by the provision of a special reward, and to allow
55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
56 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
57 Id. at 158.
58 464 U.S. 417.
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the public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired. 5 9
The Court found, at least in part, that the motivation created by lim-
ited-time monopolies spurs the creation of works. 60 Therefore, as re-
flected by Paramount and Sony, the effect on the total amount of works
should be a significant policy consideration when debating whether to
extend copyright protection.
In the case of a sound recording public performance right, copy-
right extension would likely increase the total amount of such works.
Measuring the potential impact that a performance royalty would
have on the creation of new sound recordings is very difficult, and I
have not found any empirical studies addressing the likely impact of a
public performance right on the creation of new sound recordings.
Despite the absence of such empirical studies, scholars have noted the
probable positive impact such a performance right (i.e., royalty to the
performer) would have on the many artists that operate at the eco-
nomic margin of the music industry.61 For an artist living paycheck-to-
paycheck, even the prospect of a small royalty may induce the produc-
tion of more works or reaffirm the artist's desire to continue his musi-
cal career. 62 Should Congress protect public performances of sound
recordings, performers will then have an additional economic incen-
tive to record more works, potentially resulting in an increase in
sound recordings.
Additionally, because of the dramatic effects of music piracy, the
economic incentive argument has become increasingly compelling for
noneconomic-margin artists. In 2002, piracy cost the music industry
$4.3 billion, with a significant portion of this loss being artists' lost
royalties on album sales.63 Music piracy accounted for nearly two bil-
lion copies of musical works in 2001, meaning that almost forty per-
cent of all music sold worldwide was pirated,64 with the top selling and
most popular radio songs pirated most often.65 The music industry
believes these trends will likely continue as copying equipment be-
59 Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
60 Id.
61 Matthew S. DelNero, Long Overdue? An Exploration of the Status and Merit of a
General Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 51 J. Co'RG-rr Soc'Y U.S.A. 473,
505-06 & n.190 (2004).
62 Id.
63 Irrr'L FED'N OF THE PHOTOGRAPHIC INDUS., Music PIRACY REPORT 1 (2002),
available at http://banners.noticiasdot.com/termometro/boletines/docs/con-
sultoras/ifpi/2002/ifpi-piracy2002/ifpi-piracy2002.pdf.
64 Id. at 2.
65 Id. at 3.
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comes cheaper and easier to use, thus lowering prospective pirates'
barriers to entry.66 Therefore, due to their declining revenues from
global music piracy, current performers may potentially be even more
receptive (i.e., create more works) to copyright amendments protect-
ing sound recording performances.
A common counterargument to extending a performance right
to sound recordings based on an incentive theory is that potential roy-
alties would be a "windfall" to performers who created past works.
However, one should not view royalties for a public performance right
as a "windfall" to performers for two reasons. First, performers have
never had a sound recording performance right, and so music, televi-
sion, and movie producers have long benefited from the public per-
formances of these sound recordings without compensating the
performers. Second, according to the Register's 1978 report, poten-
tial sound recording royalties could amount to "less than one-half of
one percent of [the music industry's] estimated net sales," 67 which
could hardly be considered a "windfall."68 Therefore, congressional
extension of copyright protection to sound recording performances
should not be construed as a "windfall" to performers. Such royalties
may be small compared to the music industry's total revenues and
broadcasters have benefited, at the performers' expense, from the
long-term absence of sound recording performance rights.
Another counterargument to the economic incentive argument is
that the artists do not control the amount of sound recording public
performances, and therefore congressional action creating an incen-
tive for artists to record more sound recordings may not necessarily
lead to a greater number of public performances. That is, even
though the artists may be enticed to create more recordings, broad-
casters ultimately control the decision of how many sound recordings
to air publicly. Because higher costs (paying additional royalties) will
act as a disincentive for broadcasters to transmit sound recordings,
broadcasters will transmit fewer sound recording performances. In
short, the counterargument follows that despite the new economic in-
centive arguably increasing the total number of sound recordings, the
total number of performances of those sound recordings would actually
66 Id.
67 Statement of the Register of Copyrights, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763, 12,764-65 (Mar.
27, 1978).
68 Note the balance that copyright laws must strike between preventing overcom-
pensation of authors yet providing enough incentive for authors to create more
works. While lower royalty figures may lessen the incentive impact on creating new
works, "even a modest performance royalty could spur the ability and desire to pro-
duce new works." DelNero, supra note 61, at 505 (emphasis added).
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decrease because broadcast companies would incur additional ex-
penses and would likely minimize these expenses by reducing their
number of sound recording public performances.
While this counterargument is intuitively appealing, it ultimately
fails (or is at least mitigated) when analyzed with respect to the practi-
cal competitive marketplace for two reasons. First, broadcast compa-
nies, especially companies broadcasting sound recording
performances, are under intense competitive pressures, pushing them
towards providing more public performances of sound recordings. In
any given city, one is likely to find multiple stations broadcasting simi-
lar musical genres, and audiences have very low switching costs. In
other words, the broadcast stations are in a prisoner's dilemma-if
stations reduce the amount of music aired by backing away from their
"thirty-minute commercial-free" pledge, another station playing simi-
lar music will likely lure listeners by providing its own thirty-minute
commercial-free promise. Audiences have very low switching barriers
(generally turning the dial) that would prevent them from switching
to the station that provided the more commercial-free broadcast.
Therefore, the broadcast industry's competitive market pressures will
likely dampen the broadcasters' desire to reduce the amount of public
performances.
Secondly, this counterargument fails to take into account the in-
tangible benefits created by a greater amount of sound recordings-
namely, the likely increased quality69 of sound recording perform-
ances. Arguably, the greater the number of total sound recordings,
the more likely public performances, as a whole, will be of a higher
quality. In other words, had Congress provided protection for public
performances of sound recordings a year ago, and artists, led by the
incentive of greater profits, recorded more works, it is arguable that
some of those works (that would not have been recorded but for the
additional incentive) would supersede what is playing on the radio
69 By "quality," I do not mean the crispness of reception or clarity of sound, but
rather the overall enjoyment the public gains by listening to the sound recordings.
The basic argument follows that if a sound recording public performance right does
increase the total number of sound recordings, the public may enjoy listening to
some of the newly created works more than those works that artists would have cre-
ated even without a performance right. That is, the songs played on the radio are in
competition with one another for airtime, and, as in nature, the strong tend to sur-
vive. Thus, the more sound recording creations, the more competition among songs
for airtime, and ultimately radio stations will play what listeners want to hear, mean-
ing that radio stations will play the better songs. Therefore, in the aggregate, the
quality of the sound recordings performed on the radio can be said to be a higher
"quality."
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today. This directly benefits consumers through greater diversity of
works.
For instance, assume the greater economic incentive enticed
Bruce Springsteen to record a song that he otherwise would not have
recorded. It is possible that the public would enjoy hearing Spring-
steen's song more than Britney Spears's song, which is currently play-
ing on the radio but would have been created regardless of whether
Congress protected sound recordings. Thus, a sound recording per-
formance right may increase the overall quality of public perform-
ances, but the counterargument to economic incentive focuses solely
on the amount of performances gained or lost due to royalties and
fails to consider possible increases of sound recording quality.
Therefore, because the competitive market forces tend to push
broadcast companies towards expanding the total amount of public
performances broadcasted and the overall quality of sound recording
performances may potentially increase, a greater economic incentive
spurring artists' creation of sound recordings will potentially increase
the amount and overall quality of works. Next, this Note will employ a
more fights-based analysis to the issue of a sound recording perform-
ance right.
2. Natural Rights Argument
In addition to the incentive rationale, one could also argue for a
sound recording public performance right based on a natural rights
justification. The ideas of seventeenth century philosopher John
Locke provide the intellectual underpinnings of the natural rights jus-
tification for protecting intellectual property.70 The heart of Lockean
theories is that by "applying labor to something within the commons,
one may remove, or privatize that portion of the commons."7 ' That is,
by investing one's time and energy into creating or modifying some-
thing not yet owned by another, that person has a natural right to
profit from the object he has created or modified. As this Note will
next discuss, this natural rights argument is equally adaptable to copy-
right situations.
As discussed in Part II.A.1, most scholars and judges view the
Constitution as providing for an "incentive theory" of intellectual
property. 72 That is, Congress may create limited-time monopolies to
70 Andrew R. Sommer, Trouble on the Commons: A Lockean Justification for Patent
Law Harmonization, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 141, 153-56 (2005).
71 Id. at 155.
72 See, e.g., U.S. Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1035 n.12 (3d Cir.
1984) ("The constitutional provision authorizing copyrights and patents, and the stat-
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entice artists to create more works. However, it could also be said that
Congress is actually balancing the public's right to access and benefit
from intellectual property with the author's right to profit from the
fruits of his labor, thereby addressing the author's "natural right" to
profit from his work. 73
While courts have historically discussed copyright protection fol-
lowing the incentive theory, some have also approached the copyright
issues from a natural rights perspective.7 4 In Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.,75 the Supreme Court recognized that intel-
lectual property laws confer monopolies because the "labors of authors"
generally benefit the public 76 and the practical "effect of our copy-
right law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor."77
This language shows the Court's recognition of a connection between
the labor of authors and a right to profit from that labor.
Likewise, the Court in the International News Service v. Associated
Press78 misappropriation case also relied on natural rights theories.
The Associated Press (AP) sued its competitor in the news writing
market, International News Service ("News Service"), for misappropri-
ation of the AP's news stories.7 9 Specifically, News Service would
purchase a copy of the AP's news stories, appropriate the facts from
the story, and write a News Service story based on those facts.8 0 News
Service effectively used the AP's information gathering, labor, and ex-
penditure of money to write News Service's own competing stories. In
finding for the AP, the Court relied on natural rights arguments, stat-
ing that the "right to acquire prperty by honest labor. . . is as much
utes implementing it, are based on the 'incentive' theory, in contrast to continental
systems that are based on a 'natural rights' theory.").
73 Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of Interna-
tional News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 413-15 (1983). Baird
concludes that there are no practical differences in relying on an incentive or natural
rights based theory. Id. at 421.
74 Supreme Court authority here is merely intended to show a general accept-
ance of the natural rights theory as a reason underlying copyright protection. This Note
argues for congressional action, which in this case is not required to follow Supreme
Court precedent.
75 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
76 Id. at 429 (emphasis added) ("'The sole interest of the United States and the
primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.'" (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948))).
77 Id. at 432 (emphasis added) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
78 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
79 Id. at 232.
80 Id. at 231.
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entitled to protection as the right to guard property already ac-
quired."'8 1 The Court continued, holding that one is entitled to the
creative work that was wrought by the author's "expenditure of labor,
skill, and money."82
Similarly, this natural rights theory is applicable to a sound re-
cording public performance right. It is undeniable that music artists
expend labor, skill, and money rehearsing, fine tuning, and recording
their songs. Like in the Sony and International News Service cases,
others (the general public and broadcast companies) are benefiting
from the performance of artists' sound recordings, but the artists who
labored to create the recordings are not directly benefited by the pub-
lic performance of their labors and talents. Therefore, artists have
invested their time, energy, and creativity in these works, resulting in
the natural right to receive compensation for the broadcast of their
recordings.
Some may argue that the Supreme Court's rejection of the "sweat
of the brow" argument in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Ser-
vice Co. 8 3 signals a shift in the Court away from recognizing that artists
have a natural right to the profits from their expenditure of time, en-
ergy, and creativity. In Feist, the plaintiff telephone company brought
a copyright infringement action against the defendant (a publisher of
telephone directories), claiming that the defendant's appropriation
of the plaintiff's white page information (i.e., names, addresses, etc.)
amounted to copyright infringement.84 In arguing that the phone
book's information should be protected, the plaintiff relied on the
"sweat of the brow" doctrine. The underlying notion of the plaintiffs
"sweat of the brow" argument was that its work compiling the facts for
the phone book should be rewarded even though the facts contained
no originality.8 5 However, the Court rejected the "sweat of the brow"
argument, finding for the defendant. The Court held that originality
is a constitutional prerequisite for obtaining copyright protection, 86
and that lack of originality in the plaintiffs phonebook could not be
overcome merely by one's hard work in compiling the facts.8 7
One could then rely on Feist's rejection of the "sweat of the brow"
doctrine as an argument against extending copyright protection based
on a natural rights theory. More specifically, the counterargument
81 Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
82 Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
83 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
84 Id. at 342-44.
85 Id. at 352-55, 359-60.
86 Id. at 346-47.
87 Id. at 353-61.
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would follow that because the Supreme Court rejected the "sweat of
the brow" argument in Feist, an argument that sound recording artists
should be compensated for their expenditures of time, energy, and
creativity should likewise fail.
Ultimately, because musical artists are not using the "sweat of the
brow" doctrine in the same sense as the plaintiff did in Feist, the
Court's rejection of the "sweat of the brow" doctrine in Feist does not
necessarily preclude relying on a natural rights theory to support a
sound recording performance right. The plaintiff in Feist attempted
to use its hard work in compiling the facts as a substitute for originality,
which the Court found was constitutionally required for protection. 88
In other words, the Feist Court held that hard work in crafting the
works is not a substitute for the required element of originality. How-
ever, the Court did not hold that the "sweat of the brow" or natural
rights theories were inappropriate policy rationales for congressional
extension of copyright protection.
In the sound recording creator's situation, there is no absent con-
stitutional prerequisite that is precluding Congress from protecting
the public performances of sound recordings. The artists' use of a
natural rights argument is put forth in the sense of weighing fairness
(i.e., that it is not fair for broadcasters and the public to benefit from
the artists' expenditures of time and energy in creating the sound re-
cordings) and not as a substitute for some missing, but required, copy-
right prerequisite. In fact, not only do sound recordings contain the
necessary characteristics for copyright protection,89 but nondigital
sound recordings "are the only copyrighted works that are capable of
being performed that are not granted a [public performance
right]."90 Because public performances of sound recordings are not
lacking a prerequisite for protection, artists are using a natural rights
theory to supplement their fairness argument, and not, as the plaintiff
in Feist unsuccessfully attempted, to substitute natural rights for a con-
stitutionally required element.
Therefore, reliance on the Feist Court's rejection of the "sweat of
the brow" doctrine is not a compelling counterargument to the artists'
natural rights argument because artists, unlike the Feist plaintiff, are
88 Id. at 346-47.
89 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (stating that, in general, copyright protection ex-
tends to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression"
and expressly includes "sound recordings" as a type of work Congress may protect);
supra Part I.A.
90 WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 222
(1995).
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not using natural rights as a substitute for some constitutionally re-
quired prerequisite. Thus, because musicians expend labor, skill, and
money while creating original sound recordings, Congress should ac-
knowledge that artists have natural rights to profit from the public
performance of their recordings and amend the Copyright Act of
1976 to include a sound recording public performance right. By al-
lowing broadcasters and the public to benefit from sound recording
performances without compensating those who expended labor, skill,
and money creating the sound recording, Congress is violating the
artists' natural rights.
3. Parallel Protection-The Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act
Congress granted a limited sound recording performance right
when it enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
Act of 1995 (DPRA).91 The DPRA amended the Copyright Act of
1976--adding § 106(6)-to provide protection for public perform-
ances "by means of a digital audio transmission" of sound record-
ings.92 This limited protection does not extend to traditional analog
television or radio broadcasts, but rather, § 106(6) protects only
sound recording public performances via digital transmissions, such
as satellite radio.93
After congressional adoption of § 106(6), the question has be-
come: how can Congress recognize a sound recording performance
right in public digital transmissions but not extend the same protec-
tion to performances in nondigital transmissions? Whether broadcast-
ers transmitted the sound recording digitally or not, there exists the
public performance of a work (the sound recording) that is separate
and distinct from the underlying musical composition,94 and this work
is being transmitted or broadcast publicly. Simply put, copyright pro-
tection in sound recording transmissions hinges on the type of trans-
mission-if the recording is digitally transmitted, then it is protected;
but, if the recording is transmitted in an analog format (i.e., nondig-
itally), then the 1976 Act does not protect it.
91 Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.).
92 Id. sec. 2, § 106(6), 109 Stat. at 336.
93 See id. (protecting only "digital audio transmission[s]"); XM Radio, Learn
About XM, http://www.xmradio.com/learn/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 5, 2005)
(describing a satellite radio service that offers over 150 digital channels).
94 See supra Part I.B.
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In stark contrast to sound recordings, every other type of work
that enjoys a right of public performance has not been artificially lim-
ited to a particular method of transmission.9 5 When Congress
adopted § 106(4), it protected those works' public performances re-
gardless of the transmission type.9 6 For instance, assume the cable
television channel TBS and the broadcast network NBC both air Bill
Murray's classic, Caddyshack.97  Caddyshack's public performance
would be protected under § 106(4)'s right to perform audio visual
works publicly.9 8 However, TBS may transmit Caddyshack digitally
(through satellite and digital cable) while NBC's broadcasts are
largely transmitted nondigitally. Because Caddyshack's public per-
formance is protected under § 106(4), the method of the public per-
formance's transmission is irrelevant. Caddyshack's copyright owners
are thus entitled to royalties for the public performance of the audio
visual work whether digitally transmitted by TBS or nondigitally trans-
mitted by NBC because Congress decided that for all protectible pub-
lic performances (except sound recordings) it was the act of public
perfonnance that resulted in whether owners of copyrights earned com-
pensable royalties, not the method by which the public performance
was transmitted.
As for public performances of sound recordings, the sound re-
cording itself is the same whether digitally transmitted or not (i.e., it is
the same song), and the act of public performance occurs whether the
work is digitally transmitted or not. Therefore, it follows that if artists
create sound recordings, those artists should be directly compensated
for public performances of the sound recordings without regard to the
method of public performance transmission.
The Senate, however, argued in its DPRA report that digital trans-
missions should be treated differently than nondigital transmissions. 99
The Senate concluded that differential treatment was appropriate be-
cause digital transmissions are of higher quality, many are commercial
free, and some even allow for audio-on-demand.100 Therefore, be-
95 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000).
96 Id. However, note that there are certain limitations on a copyright holder's
right of performance, but these limitations are largely dependent upon the particular
establishment or circumstances surrounding the performance (e.g., nonprofit recitals
or performances in classroom settings), not the transmission method. Id. § 110.
97 Arguably, Bill Murray's greatest role has been Carl Spackler, the colorful yet
slightly psychotic groundskeeper at Bushwood Country Club. Matt Brighton, Cad-
dyshack: 20th Anniversary Edition (movie review), http://dvdauthority.com/re-
views.asp?ReviewID=502 (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
98 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
99 S. REp. No. 104-128, at 4 (1995), as repinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 356.
100 Id.
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cause of these "unique" attributes, the Senate argued that it is not
inconsistent to extend protection to digital transmissions of sound re-
cordings while withholding similar protection from nondigital
transmissions.
The Senate's justification for protecting performance rights of
digital transmissions but not nondigital transmissions, however, is un-
persuasive. Many examples exist of nondigital public performances
that contain similar attributes to those the Senate listed as distinguish-
ing attributes of digital transmissions. For instance, nondigital cable
television stations exist that broadcast commercial-free CD-quality mu-
sic twenty-four hours a day.10 Further, any cable television station
that is broadcasting music, broadcasts static-free, CD-quality sound re-
cordings. As for audio-on-demand, a simple phone call to most radio
stations will result in the station playing a requested song; and, for a
more direct on-demand example, one need look no further than the
local bar's jukebox, which probably also plays CDs, resulting in CD-
quality sound performances available on-demand.
In short, the attributes Congress relied on as reasons to extend
protection to digital performances can be found in nondigital trans-
missions as well. In the end, Congress is distinguishing between those
with and without rights of performance based not on the type of work
created and performed but on the method of transmission. There-
fore, Congress should reconcile this disjunctive outcome by extending
protection to public performances of sound recordings generally,
whether they are transmitted digitally or not.
4. Foreign Regimes and Reciprocity
The final argument for amending the Copyright Act of 1976 to
include a performance right for sound recordings centers on foreign
sound recording copyright laws and reciprocity. Despite being the
worldwide leader in sound recording creations, the United States is
one of the only developed countries that has yet to recognize perform-
ance rights in sound recordings. 10 2 Approximately seventy-five na-
tions, including nine European Union countries, recognize such
rights. 103
101 Music Choice cable channel offers a nondigital array of twenty-four hour, CD-
quality music to more than thirty-seven million households daily. Music Choice,
About Us, http://www.musicchoice.com/what.weare/what-we-are.html (last visited
Oct. 5, 2005).
102 William H. O'Dowd, The Need for a Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings,
31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 249, 261 (1994).
103 Id.
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While the United States has no obligations, by treaty or otherwise,
to extend protection to sound recording performances simply be-
cause most developed countries extend such protection, Congress's
exclusion of a performance right does carry negative economic impli-
cations for U.S. performers. The Recording Industry Association of
America recently estimated that the U.S. performers' potential for-
eign public performance royalty share was worth over $120 million
annually. 10 4 However, most foreign countries recognize performance
rights of normative citizens only if those citizens' native countries also
recognize a public performance right in sound recordings. Without
amending the copyright laws to provide for a performance right, lack
of reciprocity will prevent U.S. performers from realizing the majority
of this $120 million revenue stream.' 0 5 Because the United States ex-
ports more sound recordings than it imports,106 should Congress
amend the 1976 Act to extend protection to public performances of
sound recordings, many foreign governments would require royalty
payments to U.S. performers, which would outweigh the flow of royal-
ties from U.S. broadcasters to foreign performers. Thus, amending
the 1976 Act to include a performance right would unlock the $120
million revenue pool for U.S. performers, which is larger than the
liability U.S. broadcasters would incur in having to pay foreign per-
formers. The result is a net economic gain for the United States.
Therefore, whether one analyzes the performance right issue
from an incentive or natural rights theory, from policies guiding pro-
tection of digital performances, or from an international economic
perspective, each argument points in favor of amending the 1976 Act
to include public performance rights for sound recordings. However,
as this Note will next address, there are counterarguments to ex-
tending protection to public performances.
B. Arguments Against Congressional Adoption of a Performance Right
1. Exposure
A common argument against adopting a performance right in
sound recordings is that performances indirectly benefit the artist by
increasing the artist's exposure. Because artists profit from the sale of
their albums, the argument follows that these performances are
merely free advertising. Therefore, according to the exposure argu-
104 Id. at 263.
105 Id.
106 See id. at 262 (stating that the United States is by far the leader in sound re-
cording creations).
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ment, artists are compensated for the public performances of their
sound recordings by increased album sales, and thus Congress need
not extend protection to sound recording performances.
The exposure argument, however, is unpersuasive for five
reasons:
(1) not all music genres benefit from public performances to the
same degree (if at all); (2) a direct royalty may supplement the free
exposure value; (3) the timing of the exposure is not accounted for;
(4) exposure is not taken into account with other types of works; and,
(5) the exposure argument views a potential right to public perform-
ance only in a narrow economic sense.
First, while the argument that increased radio and television play
leads to greater album sales may be persuasive in popular music
genres, the same cannot be said for all categories of music. Jazz, op-
era, and classical music, for example, do not benefit nearly as much
from radio exposure as other musical genres, and many of these per-
formers earn the majority of their musical incomes from live shows
and other avenues apart from album sales. In particular, the average
jazz musician earns about forty-nine percent of his respective income
from nonmusician related pursuits, such as music and jazz teaching,
and nonmusical occupations. 10 7 Thus, not all types of performers are
adequately compensated from radio exposure.
Second, the indirect value of the advertising (increased album
sales) may be taken into account when calculating royalties. This does
not have to be an all-or-nothing proposition. That is, it is possible to
calculate an artist's benefit from increased exposure and offset the
royalties accordingly. 0 8 Those who benefit more from increased ex-
posure would receive less in the form of direct royalty payments, and
thus broadcasters would compensate more directly those artists who
do not receive a high level of exposure, such as jazz, opera, and classi-
cal musicians.
Third, the exposure argument fails to take into account the tim-
ing of the exposure. While a broadcaster transmitting a recently re-
107 JazzWest.com, New Study Reveals Insight into Jazz Scene, http://
www.jazzwest.com/articles/rcac-study.html#Income (last visited Oct. 5, 2005) (re-
porting findings from study of jazz musicians' work lives).
108 For instance, performers would likely form some type of performing society
(such as what BMI provides for performances of musical works). In dividing up the
royalty figures, an equation can be used so as to compensate works relative to the
amount that each work was performed. However, for those whose songs benefited the
most from free exposure (i.e., a number-one song for an extended period of time)
the output of this equation can be reduced to reflect the artist's previously-earned
exposure benefit.
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leased Eminem' 0 9 song may drive Eminem's record sales, the same
cannot be said for older albums because the exposure value dimin-
ishes over time. For instance, oldies stations continue to play songs
that have little, if any, current sales, and thus the artists of older works
receive little, if any, exposure value from the public performances of
their sound recordings. However, the song is nonetheless valued by
the audiences that listen to, and the radio stations that prosper from,
the song's performance.
Fourth, Congress has extended the right of public performance
to other types of works even though those works also benefit from
exposure. Motion pictures, for instance, enjoy a right to perform the
work publicly.110 However, performances of motion pictures may also
drive sales of DVDs, movie posters, soundtracks, and other product
tie-ins. Despite the. motion picture company gaining exposure value
from its movies' public performances, Congress has granted motion
pictures a right of public performance and denied this right to musi-
cal artists.
The final argument for why exposure is inadequate compensa-
tion for sound recording performances is that viewing a right to pub-
lic performance as a right to mere economic compensation too
narrowly defines "right" of public performance. A right of public per-
formance could possibly entail more than merely a right to receive
royalties. For instance, an artist may wish that his song not be played
on certain types of radio stations, in certain geographic areas, or in
sleazy strip clubs; 1 and, with a right of ptiblic performance, a per-
former could prevent disgraceful groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan,
from adopting the performer's song as rally music. A public perform-
ance right could conceivably allow the artist to have more control over
who publicly performs his song and when, which may be crucial in
sculpting the artist's public image. 1 2
Therefore, the exposure argument: (1) does not adequately com-
pensate all types of performers; (2) need not be an all or nothing
proposition (royalties may be offset by the exposure value); (3) does
109 Eminem is the stage name for popular rap artist Marshall Mathers. Jason
Ankeny & Bradley Torreano, Eminem Biography, http://www.mp3.com/eminem/
artists/315157/biography.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
110 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000).
111 For moral, religious, or other reasons, some artists may also prefer that their
sound recordings not be publicly performed at bars, brothels, or a political candi-
date's rally.
112 Instead of signing up with a performing society, artists and music companies
could control with whom they license, thereby controlling to some extent who may,
and may not, publicly perform the artists' works.
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not take timing of the exposure into account; (4) suffers from hypoc-
risy because other types of work (mainly movies) benefit from expo-
sure and have a right of public performance; and, (5) defines "right"
of public performance too narrowly by focusing exclusively on the
right to receive royalties. Thus, the exposure argument fails and Con-
gress should amend the Copyright Act of 1976 to protect public per-
formances of sound recordings.
2. Double Dip
Another often cited argument against extending a public per-
formance right to sound recordings is the "double dip" argument.
That is, broadcasters argue that they pay royalties to composers and,
often, composers and performers are one in the same-resulting in a
possible double payment to the performer. This argument, however,
is without merit because the courts and Congress have historically rec-
ognized the musical composition and the sound recording as separate
and distinct works. 1 3 Therefore, it can be argued that there is no
"double dipping" taking place, but rather it is "single dipping" twice as
the broadcasters would be compensating the creator of two separate
and distinct works: the musical work and the sound recording.
Other types of works could also be said to "double dip," but Con-
gress extends protection nonetheless. For example, let's examine the
rights of Tom Clancy, the author of Debt of Honor.1 4 Debt of Honor,
unlike seemingly every other Clancy novel, 115 has yet to be made into
a movie. However, assume that Clancy decides to produce a motion
picture version of Debt of Honor, and that he personally writes the
screenplay and finances the production. Conceivably, Clancy could
have the rights to three separate and distinct works: the novel, the
screenplay, and the motion picture. Thus, with one public perform-
ance of the 'motion picture, Tom Clancy could receive royalties from
the public performance of the movie as well as from the performance
of the separate and distinct works underlying the movie. Yet Congress
would not prevent Tom Clancy from "double (or even triple) dip-
ping" from the performance of his separate and distinct works.
Therefore, Congress should not withhold a public performance right
113 See supra Part 1.B.
114 TOM CLANCY, DEBT OF HONOR (1994).
115 See Internet Movie Database Inc., Tom Clancy Filmography, http://
imdb.com/name/nm0002007/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2005) (listing the many films
based on Tom Clancy's novels, including Hunt for Red October, Sum of All Fears, Patriot
Games, and Clear and Present Danger, among others).
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in sound recordings on a theory that some performers may earn royal-
ties from their creation of separate and distinct works.
3. Financial Burden on Broadcasters
Broadcasters often argue that they cannot afford the additional
cost accompanying a performance right because the broadcasters are
already paying royalties to the composer of the music.'1 6 This argu-
ment is unpersuasive.
The economic reality is that broadcasters will initially have higher
costs due to the payment of additional royalty figures to performers,
but because of the cost-shifting market dynamics broadcasters will not
bear the complete burden of the additional royalty expenses. Because
an amendment to the Copyright Act of 1976 would affect all like
broadcasters equally (in the sense that all music stations playing simi-
lar genres would likely pay similar total royalty fees), the 1976 Act's
amendment would likely leave the competitive balance between
broadcasters undisturbed. That is, if you have two competing radio
stations, neither station would have a competitive advantage over the
other because both stations' costs would rise comparatively equally." 17
Because all stations are incurring this additional royalty cost, all the
stations can generally increase what they charge advertisers for air-
time, thereby shifting (at least partially) the burden of the additional
royalty cost to advertisers, leaving profit margins similar to pre-addi-
tional royalty levels. In turn, advertisers will likely shift (at least par-
tially) this increased cost to consumers (who have long benefited from
a lack of public performance right at the expense of musical artists) in
the form of higher-priced goods.'u
Furthermore, there is a question as to what extent, if at all, a pub-
lic performance right in sound recordings would disturb the eco-
nomic balance in the broadcasting industry. According to the
Register's report, "[t]here is no hard economic evidence .. .to sup-
port arguments that a performance royalty would disrupt the broad-
116 O'Dowd, supra note 102, at 266.
117 Note, this assumes that market forces will not allow stations to reduce the num-
ber of performances on their airwaves, as argued in Part II.A.1.
118 While higher-priced consumer goods may seem like a negative aspect, remem-
ber that the royalty incentive to create additional sound recordings will likely benefit
consumers, and therefore it is not inequitable for the public to bear a portion of the
new royalty. Likewise, broadcasters benefit from an increased number of sound re-
cordings to broadcast, resulting in possibly more people tuning in, which will also
benefit advertisers. Therefore, all the parties (broadcasters, advertisers, and public)
who benefit from public performances of sound recordings would share in the addi-
tional royalty cost.
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casting industry, adversely affect programming, and drive marginal
stations out of business."11 9 In fact, assuming a sound recording per-
formance right does increase the amount and quality120 of sound re-
cordings, this could possibly result in larger audiences listening for
longer time periods, which may equate to larger broadcaster revenues
(at least partially offsetting the increase in royalty expenses). There-
fore, it is inconclusive whether an additional royalty cost would nega-
tively disrupt the broadcasting market, and it is possible that a
performance right may lead to larger revenues for broadcasters.
Thus, whatever the extent of this additional royalty burden (if
any), it would not be born solely by broadcasters, but rather the addi-
tional royalty will likely be diffused to broadcasters, advertisers, and
consumers, all of whom benefit from an increased number of works.
Therefore, the broadcasters' argument that protecting sound record-
ing performance rights will impose too great a cost on broadcasters
fails, and Congress should amend the 1976 Act to cover such rights.
CONCLUSION
Congress has long had the constitutional power to legislate copy-
right protection, particularly the power to legislate protection of
sound recordings. Despite this long-standing power, Congress has yet
to extend comprehensive protection to public performances of sound
recordings.
As discussed in Part II, it does not matter whether Congress fol-
lows an incentive or natural rights theory of copyrights because follow-
ing either theory leads to the same conclusion: Congress should
amend the Copyright Act of 1976 to protect sound recording per-
formances. Congress, at least partially, acknowledged the need for
performance rights with the passage of the DPRA, which extended
protection to performances via digital transmissions. However, the
DPRA also highlights the arbitrariness of protecting the same type of
work based merely on the method of transmission. Finally, once per-
formance rights are accorded in the United States, its performers will
gain rights to significant foreign royalty revenue streams.
Counterarguments against adopting an amendment are largely
unpersuasive. The exposure argument does not equitably compen-
sate all artists in all genres. The "double dip" argument runs counter
to the general principle that an author/artist has a right to be com-
pensated for each separate and distinct work. Likewise, the broadcast-
119 Statement of the Register of Copyrights, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763, 12,765 (Mar. 27,
1978).
120 See supra note 69.
718 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81:2
ers' "too costly" argument fails because broadcasters will likely not
bear the sole cost of additional royalties, and it is uncertain as to
whether these additional royalties would even negatively disrupt the
broadcasting market.
Therefore, Congress should amend the Copyright Act and pro-
vide for a sound recording performance right. After all, isn't it time
that Congress shows the Righteous Brothers, and all sound recording
performers, that lovin' feelin'?
